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OF THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY TO THE
RIGHTS OF A SECURED CREDITOR::
A. Introduction and GeneraZ Background
Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act' permits a trustee in
bankruptcy to be subrogated to the rights of any creditor who
has a provable claim2 against the bankrupt's estate. This sub-
rogation enables the trustee to avoid any security interest which
could have been avoided by the creditor outside of bankruptcy.
Whether the creditor has the potential right to avoid the security
interest depends upon the applicable state or federal law. For
example, A obtains a mortgage (i.e., security interest) on X's
property for $1,600, but fails to record the mortgage for a week.
Prior to the recordation of the mortgage X purchases on
credit a pair of shoes for $4.64 from B. Having extended credit
prior to recordation, B can avoid A's security interest. After A
records his mortgage several additional creditors extend credit
to X. If X goes bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy can use
section 70e to be subrogated to the rights of B and increase the
bankrupt's estate by $4.64. A retains a perfected (i.e., properly
recorded) security interest worth $1,595.36 and a priority of
collection for this amount over the subsequent general creditors.
This example also illustrates the purpose of section 70c: to in-
crease the amount of the assets that the trustee is able to bring
into the bankrupt's estate. Since B had the right outside of
bankruptcy to avoid A's security interest, X's bankruptcy should
not aid A by giving him a security interest free of any claims.
Nor should A be allowed to pay the general creditor the value
of this claim. Allowing the trustee to bring the $4.64 into the
estate serves one of the overall purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act: the equality of general creditors in sharing in the estate.
*Abramson v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967).
1. 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1964). "A transfer made or suffered or obliga-
tion incurred by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this title which, under
any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or void-
able for any reason by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable
under this title, shall be null and void as against the trustee of such debtor."
2., 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
1
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The logical rule, therefore, would be to keep the right of avoid-
ance; and the trustee is the proper person to preserve this right.
In Moore v. Bay3 the United States Supreme Court inter-
preted section 10e to enlarge the effect of a trustee's subrogation
to the rights of a creditor having a provable claim against the
bankrupt's estate. The case involved a mortgagee (i.e., a holder
of a security interest) and three classes of creditors: (1) Those
who had extended credit prior to the giving of the mortgage; (2)
those who had extended credit after the giving of the mortgage,
but prior to its recordation; and, (3) those who had extended
credit subsequent to the recordation of the mortgage. The mort-
gagee admitted that the mortgage could be avoided by the first
two classes of creditors, but asserted its validity in bankruptcy
against the third class. The trustee contended that the mortgage
was void against all three classes of creditors since it was void
as to either the first or second class of creditors. In an ambiguous
opinion the Court held that the trustee could defeat the mort-
gagee's perfected security interest. Although equivocal language
was used, the case has been interpreted as standing for the
proposition that a trustee can totally avoid a perfected security
interest by subrogating himself to the rights of an actual creditor
who has a provable claim which under federal or state law
makes the security interest voidable by the creditor.
Examining the previous hypothetical, Moore has altered a
basic principle of subrogation. A obtains a mortgage for $1,600
on X's property but does not record for a week. During the
delay in recordation, B extends credit to X for a pair of shoes
worth $4.6'1. B, under applicable state law, can avoid A's
security interest. After A records his mortgage several sub-
sequent creditors extend credit to X. If X becomes bankrupt,
the trustee, by subrogation to B's rights, can reduce A's status
to that of a general creditor 4 (i.e., A would no longer have a
priority over the subsequent general creditors to collect his
$1,595.36 security interest). If all general creditors are to receive
fifty cents on the dollar, A, with his now worthless perfected
security interest of $1,600, would receive only $800.
3. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
4. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kahn, 203 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1953). See also
It re Tobias, 150 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1957). A bank's mortgage was
avoided in bankruptcy by the trustee -who was subrogated to the rights of an
ice cream seller who extended credit between 7 and 8 o'clock the morning that
the bank recorded the mortgage. The bank had not been able to record the
mortgage on the previous day when the mortgage was executed.
[Vol. 20
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The decision has persisted notwithstanding sharp criticism."
Professor Frank Kennedy, after labeling the decision an "il-
logical rule," asserted that "[i]t ran a good idea into the ground
.. . to invalidate a security interest in toto for the benefit of
all unsecured creditors because of a delay that was presumptively
prejudicial to no more than one or a very few creditors."
James MacLachlan in a bitter attack on Moore refers to the
decision as "one of the most glaring misconstructions to be en-
countered in the history of Anglo-American law."
7
The decision's basic injustice was its violation of a fundamental
principle of subrogation by giving the trustee greater rights than
the creditor to whose position the trustee was subrogated.8 For
example, if in the previous illustration the mortgagee had fore-
closed on the mortgage prior to bankruptcy, the $4.64 creditor
could have intervened by asserting that the mortgage was void
as to him. The mortgagee then would have paid the creditor
$4.64 and thereafter foreclosed on the mortgage. In bankruptcy
the trustee is now able to use the creditor's position to avoid the
perfected security interest in toto by reducing the perfected
security interest to the status of a general creditor.9
B. Subrogation of a Trustee to the Rights of a Secured Creditor
In Abramson v. Boedeker'° the bank held an assignment of
an account receivable previously owned by the bankrupt. The
bank attempted to enforce this security interest against the
bankrupt's estate. The Fifth Circuit stated that the trustee
under section Ie needed to find only a single creditor to whose
interest the assignment was voidable and that "Excel's assign-
ment, as a protected [i.e., perfected] assignment, made the Bank's
unrecorded assignment voidable."" In Moore the Supreme
Court recognized that the trustee could be subrogated to the
5. See, e.g., J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBooK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY
§ 284 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MAcLACHLAN) ; Kennedy, The Trustee in
Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65
MicH. L. REv. 1419, 1421-24 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Kennedy).
6. Kennedy at 1423-24.
7. MACLACHLAN § 284, at 330. MacLachlan then proceeds to give a sen-
tence by sentence criticism of the eight sentence decision.
8. Kennedy at 1421.
9. A better solution would seem to be to allow the secured creditor the
privilege of paying the bankrupt's estate the value of the interim creditor's
claim and becoming a general creditor to the extent of these claims; rather than
being reduced to the status of a general creditor.
10. 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967).
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rights of a general creditor. In Abramson the Fifth Circuit has
apparently extended this right to allow the trustee to be sub-
rogated to the rights of a perfected secured creditor. Whether
the court knowingly extended the Moore decision, however, re-
mains in doubt, because it never discussed the fact that Excel,
to whose rights the trustee was subrogated, was a secured cred-
itor. It mentioned only that Excel was an actual creditor as
required by section 70e.
12
Another indication that the court was not cognizant of its
extension of Moore is its failure to discuss two basic problems
arising from subrogation to the rights of a secured creditor.
First, if subrogation to the rights of a secured creditor were
allowed, the logical result would be to reduce in bankruptcy
all junior security interests to the status of general creditors.13
Second, the perfected secured creditor (in the Abramson
case a perfected assignee of an account receivable) is able to
recover on his obligation notwithstanding the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. The general creditor, whether or not he can avoid a
security interest outside of bankruptcy, is entitled only to his
pro rata share of the bankrupt's estate and can enforce no
rights in bankruptcy. A reading of section 70e would seem to
indicate that its purpose is to preserve in bankruptcy only
those rights which attach outside of bankruptcy (i.e., general
creditor avoiding a security interest) but because of bankruptcy
are barred. Since a perfected secured creditor can avoid another
interest even in bankruptcy, subrogation to a perfected security
interest would apparently be invalid under section 70e. 14
The court, furthermore, cited Roscoe Moss Company v. Dun-
can,1  In re Plonta,16 Levine v. Johnson, 17 and CorZey v.
Gorzart1 8 for the proposition that if the assignment could be
avoided by one creditor, the trustee could, through subrogation,
12. The court could have reached the same result by the use of section 70c
of the Bankruptcy Act [11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c) (Supp. 1967)], which allows
the trustee to invoke the status of the ideal hypothetical lien creditor to defeat
a security interest that is unrecorded at the time of bankruptcy. In Abramson
the bank's assignment was unrecorded at the time of bankruptcy.
13. A further discussion of this point is developed at footnote 25, infra and
the accompanying text.
14. See Kennedy at 1435.
15. 336 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1964).
16. 311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1962).
17. 287 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1961).
18. 115 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1940).
[Vol. 20
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avoid the assignment in toto. Only Corley, however, involved
a secured gap creditor.19
In Corley the sole stockholder of a corporation sold the cor-
porate assets. The sale was effected to purchase the outstanding
stock of the corporation. The benefits from the sale flowed to
the stockholder in his individual capacity and not to the corpora-
tion. This sale was void under the state law. When the coropora-
tion went bankrupt, the trustee was successful in defeating this
sale by subrogation to the rights of a secured creditor. Since
the sale was void, however, this case could not represent the
proposition that a trustee could be subrogated to the rights of
a secured creditor in all situations. After an analysis of the cases
cited and the wording of the opinion the conclusion is reached
that the Fifth Circuit had not been made aware of the issue
before it.20
The question of whether a trustee in bankruptcy can be sub-
rogated to the rights of a perfected secured creditor has been
discussed by several authorities.21 Collier on Bankruptcy argues
that a trustee may be subrogated to the rights of a perfected
secured creditor and indicates that such a conclusion is the
result of logical deduction:
1. Under section 7'0e, the trustee can be subrogated to the rights
of any creditor having a provable claim.
2. A perfected secured claim may be provable under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
3. Therefore, a trustee may be subrogated to the rights of a
perfected secured creditor.2
2
The strongest case cited by Collier in support of this argument
was CentraZ Chandelier Company v. Irving Trust Company.23
19. Roscoe Moss Co. v. Duncan, 336 F2d 670 (9th Cir. 1964) (no mention
as to whether the intervening creditor was secured or unsecured); In re
Plonta, 311 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1961) ($10 dollar unsecured creditor); Levine
v. Johnson, 287 F2d 623 (5th Cir. 1961) (at the time of the fraudulent trans-
fer, an unsecured creditor).
20. The issue of subrogation to the rights of a secured creditor apparently
was not argued before the court. The court therefore did not discuss it. The
court cannot be expected ua s Ponte to discuss issues that are not presented in
argument before it.
21. See, e.g., 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY ff 70.90, at 1034 (J. Moore ed.
1967); 1 P. COOGAx, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SFcuaRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.03 at 990-91, (1967); MAcLAcHLAN
§ 286; Kennedy at 1419; Wiseman & King, Perfection, Filing and Forms Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 580, 596 (1963)
(hereinafter cited as Wiseman).
22. 4A CoiuER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 70.90, at 1033 (J. Moore ed. 1967).
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In Cluzndelier, Company A obtained a mortgage on X's property
including any permanent fixtures to be added thereafter. Chan-
delier furnished X with light fixtures under a conditional sales
agreement. Prior to the recordation of the conditional sales
agreement, but after some fixtures had been installed, Company
A made a final advance to X. When X went into bankruptcy,
the trustee was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, a
perfected secured creditor, to defeat Chandelier's now perfected
security interests to the extent that fixtures had been perma-
nently installed in the mortgaged property. Collier contends
that the Chandelier case proceeds upon the theory that the
trustee can avoid Chandelier's security interest, with the amount
of the mortgagee's interest being deducted from the recovery
and the excess going to the bankrupt's estate. For example, if
the mortgagee's advancement was for $1,500 and the value of
the attached fixtures was $2,000, the trustee by subrogation to
the mortgagee's interest would recover only $500 for the estate.
The mortgagee, of course, would recover his $1,500. Kennedy
contends that the idea that the case proceeds upon this theory
is conjectural, for the court did not state whether it was con-
cerned with any excess recovery nor did the court state upon
what theory the case was decided.
24
While Callier and a few cases suggest that subrogation to
the rights of secured creditor is allowed, strong policy arguments
and other judicial decisions support the opposite conclusion.
Kennedy suggests that, if the trustee can be subrogated to the
rights of a secured creditor, the result in bankruptcy would be
the general avoidance of all junior liens and interests. 2 5 In
bankruptcy the trustee would be subrogated to the rights of
the senior mortgagee who has the right to avoid outside of
bankruptcy the junior mortgagee's interests. Under this in-
terpretation, therefore, the trustee could be subrogated in bank-
ruptcy to the rights of a perfected senior mortgagee with a
mortgage worth $1,000 to avoid totally the claim of the per-
fected junior mortgagee with a mortgage worth $10,000 and
24. Kennedy at 1428. The court in holding for the trustee stated:
[T]he trustee represents . . . all creditors, and is interested in preserv-
ing the assets of the estate. Incidentally, the trustee is interested in pre-
serving the validity of the mortgage security for the title company and
thus reducing a possible deficiency judgment against the bankrupt.
Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N.Y. 343, 347, 182 N.E. 10,
12 (1932).
25. Kennedy at 1424 n.20.
[Vol. 20
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reduce the junior mortgagee to the status of a general creditor.
This would be the result regardless of the value of the mortgaged
property. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, however, is to
equalize the shares received by the general creditors from the
bankrupt's estate. The Act, therefore, should not be construed
to permit one perfected security interest to be defeated by an-
other security interest when neither was prejudicial to or voidable
by a general creditor. Kennedy observes that, although total
avoidance of the junior security interest has not been followed
in any decision, this would be the unfortunate logical result
if the trustee is allowed to be subrogated to the rights of a se-
cured creditor.
MacLachlan maintains that "[i]t is illogical and indefensible
to allow the trustee to inflate a valid lien for the purpose of
using the augmentation to displace a junior lien." 20 l He asserts
that this fallacy is basically the fallacy of Moore v. Bay but
that it is buttressed by the assumption that section 70e applies
to secured interests. MacLachlan fails to explain, however, his
reasons for rejecting this application of section 70e.
The proposition that a trustee cannot be subrogated to the
rights of a secured creditor has some general judicial support.
27
In Silverman v. Wedge,2 8 a Massachusetts Supreme Court case,
a trustee sought to invalidate a sale by the bankrupt to the
defendant. The trustee alleged that a state statute made the
transfer void and fraudulent against the state since notice of
-the sale was not filed at least five days prior thereto. The
applicable state statute created a tax lien in favor of the state
giving the state the status of a secured creditor. In denying to
the trustee the use of section 70e-Moore v. Bay powers, the
court stated that the trustee did "not by his mere appointment
as trustee represent the Commonwealth. No special benefit [was]
conferred upon him by the statute." 29 In re Whitney Carriage
Company0 involved a similar situation. In deciding against
the trustee, the Federal District Court in Massachusetts declared
that "the Court should take a realistic view of the purposes
intended to be accomplished by both the Massachusetts Laws
26. MACLACHLAN § 286 at 336.
27. See, e.g., Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 201 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1953);
In re Whitney Carriage Co., 173 F. Supp. 709 (D. Mass. 1953); Silverman
v. Wedge, 339 Mass. 224, 158 N.E.2d 668 (1959).
28. 339 Mass. 224, 158 N.E.2d 668 (1959).
29. Id., 158 N.E.2d at 669.
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and the Bankruptcy Act and should apply common sense in
reaching its decision."'-3 While both cases denied the trustee
subrogation to the rights of a secured creditor, each case was
interpreting a particular state statute. Whether a trustee can
Ibe subrogated to the rights of a secured creditor under the
Bankruptcy Act, therefore, has not been squarely decided by
any court.
0. Effect of the Uniform ComtmeriaZ Code
Under the Uniform Commercial Code a perfected or unper-
fected security interest is not voidable by a general creditor.82
Most Moore v. Bay situations, therefore, will be eliminated.
There may arise two possible situations, however, in which the
trustee may be vested with section 70e-Moore v. Bay powers.
The first would occur when a general creditor reduces his claim
to a judgment and becomes a lien creditor (i.e., a secured cred-
itor). This would happen only if the owner possesses a purchase
money security interest and delays more than ten days in per-
fecting his security interest, or if the owner of a chattel mortgage
delayed in recording and a general creditor became a lien cred-
itor.13 Under the Code the interim gap creditor must also be
a secured creditor in order to avoid an unperfected security in-
terest3 4 The first situation would be true only if a trustee may
be subrogated to the rights of a perfected secured creditor. The
second situation, suggested in Co~lier,85 involves section 9-306
(5) (d) of the Code. For example, Company A sells a car to B
and sells the commercial paper given for the car to C Bank,
which perfects its security interest showing B as the owner of the
car. Because of a breach of warranty B cancels the sales contract
and returns the car. Under section 9-306(5) (d), C Bank must
rerecord its security interest, showing Company A as the owner.
If C Bank fails to rerecord the security interest until after a
general creditor extends credit and A goes bankrupt, a trustee
may be subrogated to the rights of the general creditor to
avoid in toto C Bank's perfected security interest. The general
creditor's potential ability to avoid a perfected security interest
31. Id. at 711-12.
32. UNIFORm CommEcIAL CODE § 9-301(1) (b). This section requires a
general creditor to become a lien creditor before he can avoid another security
interest.
33. UNrFORM Co!MancrA.A CODE § 9-301(2).
34. UNIFORM CommmcrAL CODE § 9-301(1) (b).
35. 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.81, at 940-42 (J. Moore ed. 1967).
[Vol. 20
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in this particular situation conflicts with other sections of the
Code.8 6 The reason for this exception is that section 9-306(5) (d)
uses the word creditor without the modifying adjective lien
found in other sections concerning the rights of secured creditors.
The Code's definition of creditor"7 includes both a lien creditor
and a general creditor.
There have appeared suggestions that the Code will totally
eliminate the effects of Moore v. Bay.38 The authors of an article
in the 'Wayne Law Review recognize that under the Code a
general creditor cannot displace an unperfected or perfected
security interest.8 9 They further contend that the effect of sub-
rogation of the trustee to the rights of a secured creditor should
not have the same result as subrogation to the rights of a
general creditor. They reason that this should invalidate only
the amount of the secured interest to whose position the trustee
is subrogated. For example, if A had an unperfected (i.e., un-
recorded) security interest of $1,000 when B became a lien cred-
itor for $250, in bankruptcy the trustee would recover $250
by being subrogated to the rights of B. A would receive the
remaining $750 (assuming, of course, A recorded prior to bank-
ruptcy). The $250 recovered by the trustee would go to B. The
result is identical to recovery outside of bankruptcy. Their
reasoning is based on the statement in Moore v. Bay that "what
thus is recovered for the benefit of the estate is to be distributed
in 'dividends of an equal per centum... on allowed claims, ex-
cept such as have priority or are secured.' ",40 They assert that
this expressly excludes secured creditors because secured creditors
recover for themselves and not for the benefit of the estate.
41
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-201, 301(1) (b).
37. UNIFORM CommERciA.L CODE § 1-201(12).
38. 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE f 9.03, at 990 (1967) ; Wiseman at 596. The
recent extension of Moore in Abramson v. Boedecker would also be eliminated.
39. Wiseman at 596.
40. 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931).
41. The authors list one exception to this proposition. When the security
interest is unperfected at the time of bankruptcy, the authors suggest that the
trustee could avoid the security interest in toto because the trustee woild
represent all the creditors and not just the few interim creditors. This result,
they state, would not be true if all the creditors had knowledge of the unper-
fected security interest. If the authors are proceeding under the theory that
section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act is applicable this would be the result. If,
however, the authors are proceeding under section 70c, knowledge by all credi-
tors of the unperfected security interest would not defeat the trustee. It is
recognized that 70c is the strongest section to employ when a security interest
is unperfected at the time of bankruptcy. This section gives the trustee the
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This conclusion, however, depends on the definition of the
phrase "for the benefit of the estate." Wiseman and King ap-
pear to interpret the phrase to mean that a person to whose
position the trustee is subrogated must have an interest in re-
covering for the benefit of the estate. A secured creditor, as
they point out, recovers for himself and not for the benefit of
the estate. Moore v,. Bay, however, allows the in tote avoidance
of a security interest. Therefore, if subrogation to a secured in-
terest were allowed, the trustee would recover the excess for the
benefit of the estate. The secured party to whose position the
trustee would be subrogated would, of course recover his full
obligation. Moore v,. Bay also states that "[t]he rights of the
trustee by subrogation are to be enforced for the benefit of the
estate.142 This would imply that the result of any subrogation
would be a recovery, whether partial or not, for the benefit
of the estate. This would not imply, as Wiseman and King
appear to contend, that a recovery for the benefit of the estate
is a condition precedent to subrogation. Therefore, since sub-
rogation to the rights of a secured creditor is not specifically
excluded from Moore v. Bay, this subrogation will result in the
in tote invalidation of the voidable security interest. The con-
clusion is reached that, while the Uniform Commercial Code
will limit the number of situations in which Moore could apply,4
the trustee is bound to the rights of the creditor to whose position he is
subrogated, the 70c trustee will be able to avoid the unperfected security
interest under any circumstance. The authors, however, appear to find a limi-
tation on the trustee's power in the Uniform Commercial Code. In section
9-301(3) the Code states that a lien creditor is to include a trustee in bank-
ruptcy. The Code section states that "unless all the creditors represented had
knowledge of the security interest such a representative of the creditors is a
lien creditor ... .. Wiseman and King contend, therefore, that if all the
creditors had knowledge, the trustee as representative for the creditors, could
not be a lien creditor and could not defeat the unperfected security interest.
This argument has two fallacies. First, under section 70c the trustee does not
act as a representative, but is given the status of an ideal hypothetical lien
creditor. Second, the argument appears to apply section 9-301(3) to 70c. Since
section 70c does not depend upon state law, a state law would be ineffective
in trying to change the effect of section 70c. Finally, although 70c would be
the strongest section to use in this one instance, their basic argument revolves
around the Code's effect upon Moore v. Bay. Moore, of course, interpreted 70e,
not 70c; see 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.62A, at 727-29 (J. Moore ed.
1967) and Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGEms L.
REv. 518, 521-25 (1960).
42. 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931).
43. UN FoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301 This section lists the situations in
which an unperfected or perfected security interest is subordinate to other
security interests; § 9-201 This section states that unless expressly provided
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it does not solve the problem of subrogation to the rights of a
secured creditor.
Coogan is another authority who contends that the Code will
eliminate the effects of Moore v. Bay. Coogan demonstrates
that under the Code a person with a perfected security interest
is, under certain circumstances, subordinate to a lien creditor.
Ile asserts that since section 70e requires a security interest to
be either fraudulent against or voidable by another creditor, a
security interest that is subordinate to another security interest
does not come within section 70e provisions.44 The Coogan
argument apparently proceeds on the theory that since the se-
cured interest would be subordinate to a lien creditor, the lien
creditor has a priority for recovering his claim over the claim
of the secured interest.
In re Consorto Construction aompany45 lends some judicial
support to the Coogan interpretation. In In re Consorto a trustee
sought to invalidate a mortgage by attempting to subrogate to
either the interests of two attaching tax liens or to the interests
of several creditors who had extended credit prior to the recor-
dation of the mortgage. The court stated that a lien perfected
before the recordation of the mortgage "prevails not under any
concept that the lien of the chattel mortgage is voidable, but by
reason of priority in time."48 This interpretation of section 0oc
and the Uniform Commercial Code would nullify the effect of
Moore v. Bay. Kennedy, however, contends that this analysis is
incorrect because it forces the operation of section 70e to depend
upon the particular lexicon of the different state legislatures.
He asserts that the purpose of section 70e is to allow the trustee
to take advantage of any law protecting creditors against fraud-
ulent conveyances or secret liens.
47
44. 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANsACrIONS UNDER
THE UNIFRM COMMERCIAL CODE ff 9.03, at 990-91 (1967). The argument pre-
sented in Coogan would be the only argument that could counter Kennedy's
statement that subrogation to the rights of a secured creditor would lead to
the avoidance in bankruptcy of all junior liens and interests (see footnote 25,
mtpra). The argument is that the junior mortgage is subordinate to the senior
mortgage; not voidable by the senior mortgage. Wiseman and King contend
that subordinate means the same as invalid. Wiseman at 596 n.54.
45. 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954).
46. Id. at 680.
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D. Oonelusion
The results of Moore v. Bay seem of minor consequence when
compared with its apparent extension in Abramsonv . Boedeeker.
While Abramson did not discuss the concept of allowing a trustee
to be subrogated to the rights of a secured creditor, on its facts
it is apparent authority for that proposition. Although this re-
sult is presently limited to the Fifth Circuit, the decision has
advanced a misconceived concept of subrogation. It will not
reach a practical judicial limitation until the total avoidance
in bankruptcy of all junior liens is allowed. This limitation,
however, is not within the scope or purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act. Since the Act is a federal statute the obvious solution
would be for Congress to amend section 70e to allow subrogation
of the trustee only to the rights of general creditors. Because
Moore v. Bay has withstood thirty-seven years of criticism,
however, it would appear that Congress is reluctant to make
any changes in this area of the Bankruptcy Act.
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code by the states
will limit the impact of Moore v. Bay. It will not, however,
resolve the question of whether the trustee can be subrogated to
the rights of a secured creditor. Under the Code, a person hold-
ing a perfected security interest can, except for one situation,
be defeated only by a lien creditor. The Code will, therefore,
have the effect of squarely presenting before a court the question
of whether a trustee can be subrogated to the rights of a secured
creditor. Only then, when a court knows exactly the issue before
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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS-WARRANTIES-
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF QUALITY UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE*
In 1793, in South Carolina, Shoolbred purchased a slave from
Tinrod. Unknown to either the buyer or the seller the poor
devil was infected with smallpox at the time of purchase and
shortly thereafter died. The buyer refused to pay the purchase
price and the seller sued. The seller's attorney argued that this
was a loss which could not be foreseen or guarded against. Sales
warranties in such cases, he asserted, should never be extended
to the question of whether the subject matter should live "an
hour or a day after the sale."'
In 1967, in Pennsylvania, the buyer purchased from the seller
two thousand one-day old chickens. Unknown to either the
buyer or seller, the birds were infected with leukosis (bird can-
cer) and soon began to die. In the buyer's suit for damages,
the seller argued that this was a loss that could not be foreseen
or cured after detection and that no action for breach of warranty
should lie.2
Both the South Carolina and Pennsylvania courts found that
the seller had breached an implied warranty of quality to the
buyer. The South Carolina decision was made, at that early
date, under common law. The Pennsylvania decision was made
under the Uniform Commercial Code provisions relating to im-
plied sales warranties, as adopted by that state.3 Since the
Code became law in this state on January 1, 1968,4 and be-
cause our court has not been faced with this question under
the new statute, it should be helpful to review some representa-
tive pre-Code South Carolina cases and a few decisions of other
jurisdictions made under the Code. The purpose of this review
will be an attempt to determine whether adoption of the Code
can be expected to change South Carolina law in the area of
implied warranties of quality arising from sales.
* Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
1. Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 Bay 324 (S.C. 1793).
2. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A. 2-314-315 (1954).
4. S.C. Cons ANN. § 10.10-101 (Supp. 1966).
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I. THE TRANsAcTio N
Before considering the types of sales warranties under the
Code, there must first be a determination that the transaction
itself is within the scope of Article 2.
The Code states that Article 2 "applies to transactions in
goods. . . ." "Goods" is defined to mean "all things (includ-
ing specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities
(Article 8) and things in action." These expressions indicate
the broad coverage intended by Article 2.
While broad coverage is intended and accomplished by the
Code, the Code has generally qualified and narrowed the scope
of coverage in many of the specific sections. The sales warranty
sections under discussion fit this pattern.
The term "transaction" implies virtually unlimited application.
Its scope of coverage is qualified, however, because section 2-314
and 2-315 warranties arise only when there has been a sale or
contract for sale. Although there are non-sales warranties within
and without the Code, the plaintiff's attorney will usually want
to bring his action under the warranty sections since proof of
negligence is not required. For the same reason, the defendant's
attorney will want to avoid a decision based solely on a con-
tractual basis. These conflicting interests will probably continue
to cause litigation with respect to whether a "sale" has taken
place.
The fact that West's volume on Words and Phrases devotes
one hundred and forty-four pages to cases defining the term
"sale" indicates that there is no definitive legal definition.7
Under the Code a "sale consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price."8 This definition seems to
assume a qualifying transaction has taken place. It proceeds
to the basic conclusion that a sale is completed by the passing
of title between two persons for a price. Since the Code fails
to define the term "transaction" it seems evident that the
courts, not the Code, must determine the scope of the term
"sale." For example, as will be discussed later, courts inter-
s. Id. § 10.2-102.
6. Id. § 10.2-105(1).
7. WORDs AND PHRASES, Sale 70 to 214 (perm. ed. 1967).
8. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.2-106(1) (Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 2,0
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preting the Code have determined that the fact that title has
passed between a buyer and a seller for a price will not auto-
matically give rise to a "Code sale" if the transaction as a whole
is a "service." The Code's definition of "sale," therefore, must
be considered in light of the overall transaction.
While the Pennsylvania decision did not have to consider the
definition of sales,9 and no South Carolina cases defining the
term have been found, other courts have found sales within the
meaning of Article 2 when an in-state "delivering" florist filled
a telegraphic order from an out-of-state florist;1O when a gas
company supplied gas to a customer's home on a month-to-month
basis;1 when goods were sold "on consignment"'21 and in the
"gift" of a gallon of antifreeze with the purchase of an auto-
mobile tire.13
When the complete transaction is determined to be a service,
the "sale" of an item deemed secondary to the overall transaction
will not get warranty protection under the Code. The surgical
insertion of a device to regulate a heartbeat, therefore, is not
a transaction constituting a sale within Article 2 with relation
to the surgeons or the hospital, because the primary relationship
of buyer and seller does not arise.' 4
A beauty parlor patron who suffered acute dermatitis and
disfigurement from loss of hair, allegedly because of the use
of certain products during a beauty treatment, could not recover
under the Code because there was no "sale of goods" within
Article 2. This type of plaintiff must seek damages in a negli-
gence action.' 5
While this "sales versus service" distinction continues, Section
2-314 settles one of the most frequently litigated questions in
this area by providing that "the serving for value of food or
9. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
10. O'Brien v. Isaacs, 32 II. 2d 105, 203 N.E.2d 890 (1965) (sales tax at
issue).
11. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A2d 612 (1964)
(breach of warranty-personal injury at issue).
12. Rottman v. Wallace, 52 Luzerne Leg. Rep. 187 (C.P. Luzerne Co.
Pa.) cited in 2 U.C.C. REP. 987 (1962) (security interest at issue).
13. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kaufman & Chernick, Inc., 337
Mass. 216, 148 N.E.2d 634 (1958) (state fair trade law at issue).
14. Cutler v. General Electric Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct, Kings County, Spl. Term,
(Part 1) cited in 4 U.C.C. REP. 300 (1967); see Cheshier v. Southampton
Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.""
In summary, most situations of potential litigation will clearly
fall within or without the coverage of Article 2. There exists,
however, a penumbral area in which the courts will have to
determine whether the purchase of an item, as a transaction,
satisfies the "sale" concept of Article 2.17 This possibility merits
careful consideration and should be the initial point of inquiry
in many of the day to day cases that will present themselves to
the general practitioner.
II. TYrms or ImPiED WARE TIms or QuALTY
UNDER TE CODE
A. Merchantability'8
In a leading British case the plaintiff had bought copper
sheathing for installation on his ship. Evidence demonstrated
that the sheathing normally lasted four or five years. This
sheathing, however, was corroded and unfit for service after
only four or five months. The court, not content with a narrow
holding, stated: "[We] wish to put the case on a broad prin-
ciple: If a man sells an article, he thereby warrants- that it is
merchantable,--that it is fit for some purpose."' 9 The term
merchantable was subsequently incorporated into the British Sale
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 102-314(1) (Supp. 1966).
17. See generally Annot., 17, A.L.R.3d 1010 (1968).
18. Implied warranty: merchantability; usage of trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on
the premises or else where is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may requre.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warran-
ties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-314 (Supp. 1966).
19. Jones v. Bright, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1172 (Ex. 1829).
[Vol. 20
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss2/7
168]COMMENTS
of Goods Act of 1893, and the Uniform Sales Act.20 South Caro-
lina did not adopt the Sales Act, however, and does not seem
to have employed the term in its case law. The carrying-forward
of its use into the Code, therefore, projects a new word into our
law.
South Carolina, from its earliest reported case,21 has used
"soundness" as a measure in implied warranty cases. The sound-
ness warranty-a sound price warrants a sound commodity2 -
arose from horse sales2s and was at one time distinctly aimed
at protection for the consumer who himself planned to use the
goods. South Carolina case law, however, has applied the
"soundness" test to applicable transactions without regard to
whether the buyer intended to re-sell 24 or use25 the goods.
The term merchantability, in its historical development, con-
templated as a party the factor-merchant who planned to re-sell
the goods to another merchant. In other words, this warranty
originally developed in application to transactions among mer-
chants, not the merchant-to-consumer sale. The goods sold had
to pass, among other tests, without objection in the trade and,
if fungible, be of fair average quality within the description;26
phrases implying quantity or bulk sales. Reference to section
2-314(2) (a) and (b) shows that these ideas have undergone very
little modification.
The scope of 2-314, however, is not limited to this idea of resale
by one merchant to another merchant. In completely rewriting
section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act the Code recognized
developing case law and the impact of judicial decisions on
the scope of this warranty. The prefatory note and comment
one of 2-314, taken together, state that the purpose of the change
in language from that of the Uniform Sales Act "is intended to
make it clear that . .. the warranty of merchantability applies
to sales for use as well as to sales for resale."
20. UNIFORTA SALES AcT § 15(2).
21. Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 Bay 324 (S.C. 1793).
22. E.g., Bond Bros. Cash & Delivery Grocery v. Claussen's Bakeries, 184
S.C. 95, 191 S.E. 717 (1937) ; Southern Iron & Equip. Co. v. Bamberg E. & W.
Ry., 151 S.C. 506, 149 S.E. 271 (1929); Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 Bay 324
(S.C. 1793).
23. See, Llewellyn, Warranty of Quality and Society: L, 36 CoLux. L. R..
699, 723-24. (1936).
24. E.g., Simmons v. Roanoke City Mills, 116 S.C. 432, 107 S.E. 903 (1921)
(sacks of meal purchased for sale in the city of Columbia and vicinity).
25. E.g., Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 Bay 324 (S.C. 1793).
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While the term "merchantable" and the term "sound," as
applied to warranties, therefore, might not have the same his-
torical meaning, "merchantability" as defined in the Code has
been extended "down" to include the consumer ;27 and "sound-
ness," as interpreted by the South Carolina court, has been ex-
tended "up" to apply to the merchant. 28 It is submitted that
these terms, as used, seem comparable and differ more in form
than in substance and actual application. Assuming this overall
similarity, however, an examination of the specific language of
section 2-314 is still necessary.
Section 2-314 still requires that the seller be a "merchant"
with respect to goods of the kind being sold. Merchant is de-
fined by the Code to mean:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge
or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be at-
tributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.29
Comment two to 2-104 further clarifies this definition and
provides that, "[t]he professional status under the definition
may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods,
specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized
knowledge as to both .... " "Obviously," the Comments go on
to say, "this qualification restricts the implied warranty to a
much smaller group than every one who is engaged in business
and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of
goods."
Notwithstanding this restriction, the vast majority of cases in-
volving implied warranties will no doubt have a "merchant"
seller involved. The practitioner should merely recognize the
possibility that his particular case might not qualify for 2-314
coverage because of failure to meet this requirement.
Reference in section 2-314 to "goods of that kind" indicates
the Code's recognition that an experienced seller of one type of
goods could be a novice in the sale of another type. The sales
manager of an automobile dealership, for example, probably
27. S.C. CoDE AwN. § 10.2-314, Comment 1 (Supp. 1966).
28. E.g., Simmons v. Roanoke City Mills, 116 S.C. 432, 107 S.E. 903 (1921).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-104 (Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 20
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would not give this warranty on the sale of his second-hand
fishing boat to a neighbor.
The remainder of section 2-814 leaves to the judiciary the
power to expand coverage. Sub-section (2) does not intend to
be an exhaustive listing of the qualities of merchantability °
and subsection (8) allows any warranty based on a usual course
of dealing.31
The overall scope of 2-314 addresses itself to whether the
buyer received goods fit for use for ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used. The numerous cases dealing with this prob-
lem are less helpful than an understanding of the underlying
theory. The statement that "[t]he entire purpose behind the
implied warranty sections of the Code is to hold the seller re-
sponsible when inferior goods are passed along to the unsuspect-
ing buyer"32 seems to represent the Code's position.
By rejecting the doctrine of caveat emptor, South Carolina, at
an early date, adopted the general sales theory presently incor-
porated into the Code. Whether the buyer receives his money's
worth will continue to be a jury question. The basic problem for
the attorney, therefore, is whether his case is within the coverage
of this section. That answer will depend as much upon the court's
interpretation of "merchant," "goods of that kind" and other
specific phrases, as it will on the facts themselves.
B. Fitness for Particular Purpose3
While merchantability and fitness for particular purpose are
often involved in a single sale, the difference between them
becomes obvious by distinguishing the word "ordinary" from
the word "particular." Comment 2 to Section 2-315 states that
a "particular purpose differs from the ordinary purpose for
which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by
30. Id. § 10.2-314, Comment 6.
31. Id. § 10.2-314(3); see, e.g., Annawan Mills Inc. v. Northeastern Fibers
Co., 26 Mass. App. 115 (1963). This case distinguished the term "cotton
waste" and "cotton linters" on the basis of usage in the trade.
(emphasis added).
32. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 850 (3d Cir. 1967)
33. Implied warranty: Fitness for particular purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
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the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business .... 
The Code gives the example of the difference between shoes,
and shoes to be used for climbing mountains.
84
A leading English case, Randafl v. Newsom,3 5 held a coach-
builder liable for damages to the plaintiff's horses and carriage
when the carriage tongue, recently constructed from a pole pur-
chased from the defendant for that purpose, broke. The court
asserted that "[t]he subject matter of the contract was not merely
a pole, but a pole for the purchaser's carriage. If the subject
matter be an article . . . to be used for a particular purpose,
the thing ... delivered must answer that description ... and
[be] reasonably fit for the particular purpose." This language
is declaratory of the theory behind this warranty.
Knowledge and reliance have traditionally been the elements
necessary to give rise to this warranty. Under the Uniform
Sales Act the buyer had to make known to the seller, expressly
or by implication, the particular purposes for which the goods
were required.( In addition, the seller had to know of the
buyer's reliance. Since the Code requires only that the seller
have "reason to know" of the particular purpose and the buyer
no longer has a duty to make the seller aware of his reliance,87
the burden of proof is now on the seller to establish that the
warranty does not arise. One example of this section's buyer
oriented approach may be recognized in purchases by patent or
trade name. The Uniform Sales Act expressly excluded such
purchases from the "particular purpose" warranty because the
purchaser did not "rely" on the seller's skill or judgment. Under
the Code, purchase by trade name may be a factor in determining
whether there is reliance on the seller's skill or judgment, but
it is not conclusive.
Finally, while a merchant would normally be involved in this
kind of transaction, the Code makes no distinction among the
classifications of sellers under this section. This warranty can
arise whenever it is justified by the particular circumstances.38
This section of the Code seems similar to the development of
the "fitness' doctrine under South Carolina's common law. In
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-315, Comment 2 (Supp. 1966).
35. 2 Q.B.D. 102 (1877).
36. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1).
37. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND Buut TRANSFERS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.02(1) (1966).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-315, Comment 4 (Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 2.0
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a leading South Carolina case8 9 the defendant purchased a soda
fountain from the plaintiff. Plaintiff's agent knew that the
defendant bought the unit to "keep his ice cream hard... and to
keep water cold." 40 While the plaintiff sought at trial to show
that the machine was ninety-six percent operable and therefore
almost perfect, our court upheld the jury's award on defendant's
counterclaim. The court explained that in the absence of an
express warranty or a non-warranty clause, the law would imply
a warranty that the article is fit and suitable for the purpose
for which it is bought.41 In another case42 the court considered
specially mixed varnish which, according to defendant, did not
meet the specific requirements for which it was sold. The court
held that when the seller has knowledge of the use to which
goods are to be put, he impliedly warrants (unless it is otherwise
affected by agreement) "that the materials sold [are] reasonably
adapted to the purpose for which they [are] . . . purchased." 48
The cases arising under the Code in other jurisdictions seem to
be substantially in accord with the few South Carolina cases
in this field.
The recommendation of a particular paint for use on stucco
walls raised the fitness warranty when the buyer relied on the
seller's judgment ;44 and a helicopter bought to be used in utility
work (i.e., laying heavy weights in construction) must perform
in that particular manner.45
In another case the ordinary purposes for which seller's holi-
day boxes were to be used was to contain individual bottles of
buyer-distiller's liquor. The fact that the boxes could not be
placed in compartments of the buyer's reshipping cases without
damaging the removable acetate band bearing information re-
quired by law did not breach the fitness for a particular pur-
pose warranty.46
To summarize, although fitness for a particular purpose, as
a specific term, seems not to have been used by our court, de-
39. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931).
40. Id. at 45, 159 S.F. at 463.
41. Id.
42. Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d
653 (1948).
43. Id. at 97, 48 S.E2d at 659.
44. Catania v. Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, cited in 4 U.C.C. REP. 470
(1967).
45. Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964).
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cisions under this section of the Code seem to be in accord with
the pre-Code South Carolina fitness standard. While the re-
liance requirement has been lessened by placing a heavier burden
upon the seller, the pre-Code South Carolina decisions seem
also to have placed a higher duty on the seller of goods for a
particular purpose.
III. CONCLUSION
The underlying theory behind these sections of the Code seems
comparable to that of the South Carolina case law. The South
Carolina buyer already possesses the protection which, through
judicial decisions, is comparable to that given by the Code. The
seller in this state has long had the duty to deliver sound goods.
The major problem in the administration of decisions under the
Code will concern the scope of coverage, and the age old prob-
lem of defining terms such as "sale," "goods" and "merchant";
terms which at once are commonly used but not definitive when
a transaction departs significantly from the "ordinary" case.
The two warranties, while both often arise in a single trans-
action, are substantially different and could require more speci-
ficity in pleading. Article 2, however, will be applied by the
court in its entirety. The attorney pleading warranties will be
sadly surprised if the other sections, particularly those dealing
with disclaimers, are not studied and understood.
The result in implied warranty cases should continue to be
the same under the new Code as it was under South Carolina
case law. The practitioner must recognize, however, that whether
he has an implied warranty action and whether he will achieve
a successful result are now dictated by statute, a sometimes less
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following World War II the United States was confronted
with the threat of International Communism. As the threat
became increasingly evident, a growing fear spread among the
American people. The public reacted predictably to this inter-
national stress with the herd instinct asserting itself in urging
conformity. Loyalty programs were developed as a distinct
manifestation of extreme public anxiety. Among these were
the blacklists (e.g., Red Channels), restrictions on union mem-
bership, restrictions on the right to participate in primary
elections, and loyalty oaths primarily for public employees.'
Loyalty oaths, although taking various forms, generally in-
volved:
[The] abjuration of belief in or advocacy of the forcible
overthrow of the government or of membership in organi-
zations so advocating, sometimes of membership in a par-
ticular organization such as the Communist Party, or con-
nections with others found "subversive" by executive or ad-
ministrative determination.
2
Following the war these oaths received general judicial affirma-
tion. By October of 1952 the Supreme Court had upheld the
validity of all loyalty oath enactments considered by it.3 In
the following years the Court restricted both the scope and
coverage of the oaths. To understand the changing judicial
attitudes over the past two decades the Supreme Court decisions
must be discussed and briefly analyzed.
II. EARLY DECISIONS
In Gerende v. Board of Supervisors4 the appellant had been
denied a place on the ballot for a municipal election on the
ground that she had refused to file an affidavit required by
Maryland law. The Maryland Court of Appeals had previously
* Whitehill v. Elkins, 88 S. Ct 184 (1964).
1. Fraenkel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IoWA L. REv. 153 (1951).
2. Id. at 155.
3. Annot, 97 L.Ed. 226, 228 (1951).
4. 341 U.S. 56 (1952).
23
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narrowed the scope of the applicable state law in S hub v. Simp-
8on.5 The Supreme Court assumed that the narrow construction
of the statute would be used by the proper Maryland authorities
and upheld the oath requirement stating:
We read this decision to hold that to obtain a place on
a Maryland ballot a candidate need only make oath that he
is not a person who is engaged 'in one way or another in
the attempt to overthrow the government by force or vio-
lence,, and that he is not knowingly a member of an organi-
zation engaged in such an attempt.6
Garner v. Board of Public Works7 came before the Supreme
Court in the same year. The oath involved was similar to the
oath in Gerende but covered a broader time period and a wider
range of prohibited activities. The petitioners were required to
swear that within the previous five years they had not advised,
advocated, taught nor been:
[A] member of or affiliated with any group, society, asso-
ciation, organization or party which advises, advocates or
teaches, or has, within said period of five (5) years advised,
advocated or taught the overthrow by force or violence of
the government of the United States of America or of the
State of California.8
The petitioners also had to swear to the same with regard to
their present and future conduct. Again the Court upheld the
validity of the oath. In disposing of the contention of denial of
due process of law, the Court stated that there was no reason to
suppose that the oath would be construed by the "California
courts as affecting adversely those persons who during their
affiliation with a proscribed organization were innocent of its
purposes .... I'
The Court upheld the validity of a New York statute in
Adler v. Board of Education,.10 The Court considered only a
portion of the statute on the merits and did not discuss the
validity of the oath provision because it had not been considered
by the state court. The statute barred from employment in the
5. 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950).
6. 341 U.S. 56, 57 (1951).
7. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
8. Id. at 718.
9. Id. at 723.
10. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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public schools persons who advocated, or belonged to organiza-
tions which advocated, the overthrow of the government by
unlawful means. The New York Board of Regents was to make
a listing of organizations of the type described. The Board
provided by regulation that membership in a listed organization
should be prima facie evidence of disqualification for employ-
ment in the New York public schools. The Court noted the
importance of determining whether a rule of exclusion from
employment based on association applied to innocent as well
as knowing activity. In upholding the regulation, the Court
affirmed the construction of the statute by the New York courts
which required knowledge of organizational purpose before
the regulation could be applied.
In 1952, Wiemann v. Updegraff" became the first Supreme
Court decision which held a loyalty oath invalid. The case
involved an Oklahoma statute barring persons from state em-
ployment solely on the basis of organizational membership,
without regard to their knowledge of the purposes of the or-
ganizations. The Court acknowledged its consideration of scien-
ter in Garner and Adler. Because the Oklahoma statute did not
require knowledge of the purposes of the organization to which
the individual belonged, the Court held the statute to be an
assertion of arbitrary power and a denial of due process of
law.
III. RECNT DEoIsioNs
The validity of a loyalty oath statute was not considered by
the Supreme Court again until 1961 in Cramp v. Board of
Public Imtruction.12 The crucial portion of that oath required
each state employee to swear that he had never lent his aid,
support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party.
The Court indicated by a series of rhetorical questions'3 "the
extraordinary ambiguity of the statutory language."' 4 It there-
fore held that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
11. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
12. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
13. There is a gradual crescendo to the final question which asks, "[i]ndeed,
could anyone honestly subscribe to this oath who had ever supported any
cause with contemporaneous knowledge that the Communist Party also sup-
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its application violates the first essential of clue process of
law.))15
This decision involved a recognizable shift in the standards
by which the Court evaluated loyalty oaths. Previous to Cramp,
the Court had required that the statute merely contain a know-
ledge requirement. Following Cramp the knowledge requirement
had to be explicit. The inclusion of a knowledge requirement,
without more, risked a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality
on the grounds of vagueness.
The Supreme Court next considered the validity of a loyalty
oath in Baggett v. Bullitt.16 The Act which the Court inter-
preted required all state employees to swear that they were not
subversive persons. A subversive person was defined as follows:
'Subversive person' means any person who commits, at-
tempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates,
abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit,
attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act
intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the
overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional
form of the government of the United States ... by revolu-
tion, force, or violence; or who with knowledge [of its
purposes] becomes or remains a member of a subversive
organization or a foreign subversive organization. 17
The Act also defined "subversive" and "foreign subversive"
organizations, declaring the Communist Party to be a subversive
organization and membership therein a subversive activity.
Applying the standards utilized in the Cramp case the Court
held the oath invalid because its language was unduly vague,
uncertain, and broad. Persons required to swear to the above
oath, the Court explained, might reasonably conclude that a
person aiding the Communist Party or teaching or advising
known members of it might be considered subversive persons.
Under the statute, the Court reasoned, this person was not
only subversive if he committed the act but also if he advised
another in aiding a third person to commit an act which would
assist a fourth person in the overthrow of the government.
15. Id. at 287.
16. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
17. Id. at 362.
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Again, by a series of rhetorical questions,' 8 the Court indicated
that this provision rendered the oath unconstitutionally vague.
Justices Clark and Harlan dissented and were very critical
of the majority opinion. The dissent considered the vagueness
contention pointing out that the Cramp case was not a similar
decision. The oath in Cramp was unconstitutionally broad and
vague because a wide range of innocent activity could easily be
included within the scope of the statute. The oath in Baggett
only involved the commission of an act intended to overthrow
the government. Overthrow of the government is the heart of
subversive activity. An act containing language limited to this
narrow purpose does not encompass prohibition of a wide range
of undefined innocent activity. The dissent asserted that:
[It was] absurd to say that, under the words of the Wash-
ington Act, a professor risks violation when he teaches
German, English, history, or any other subject included in
the curriculum for a college degree, to a class in which a
Communist Party member might sit. To so interpret the
language of the Act is to extract more sunbeams from cu-
cumbers than did Gulliver's mad scientist.19
The other contention by the majority also extracted a few
"sunbeams." It stated that a person would be considered a sub-
versive if he advised another in aiding a third person to commit
an act which would assist a fourth person in the overthrow of
the government. The words of the statute, however, clearly state
that he must advise another person to aid a third person in the
overthrow of the government. This should not have been in-
terpreted to include a wide range of undefined innocent ac-
tivity as the majority seemed to believe.
The dissenting opinion also accused the majority of failing
to follow precedent. "It is strange that the Court should find
the language of the statute so profoundly vague when in 1951
it had no such trouble with the identical language presented
by another oath in Gerende 'v. Board of Supervisors of Elec-
18. The last question asks:
[Ils selecting outstanding scholars from Communist countries as visiting
professors and advising, teaching, or consulting with them at the Uni-
versity of Washington a subversive activity if such scholars are known
to be Communists, or regardless of their affiliations, regularly teach
students who are members of the Communist Party, which by statutory
definition is subversive and dedicated to the overthrow of the Govern-
ment?" Id. at 369.
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tioMs." 20 The oath in Garner v. Board of Public Works also
presented a case of an identical loyalty oath which the court had
upheld. The majority, however, dismissed Gerende in a foot-
note21 stating that it was not applicable, and made no mention
of Garner.
The Supreme Court followed its Baggett decision by holding
a loyalty oath invalid in Elfbrandt v. Russell.22 The Arizona
legislature had enacted a statutory oath which subjected any
state employee taking it to criminal liability if he became or
remained a member of an organization that had for one of its
purposes the overthrow of the government of Arizona, when
he had knowledge of its unlawful purpose. This oath seemed
to be drawn consistently with the Supreme Court restrictions
announced in Gerende, Garner, Adler, and Viemann. The Court
considered the form of the oath and, relying upon its recent
decisions, held the statute to be vague and unconstitutionally
broad. In Elfbrandt, however, the Court did not consider
vagueness in relation to due process and the fourteenth amend-
ment. It asserted that the oath threatened first amendment
freedoms. It stated that a statute touching freedom of associa-
tion and other first amendment freedoms "must be 'narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a
clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State.' ,,23
The statute, therefore, was held invalid because it might have
punished those who were members of an organization which had
an illegal purpose and which purpose was known to the member;
although he might not have had the spedific intent to further
those unlawful aims. The Court in Gerende, Garner, and the
statute in Adler, as interpreted in Wiemann affirmed the loyalty
oath if the employee was a knowing member of an organization
with unlawful purposes. Elfbrandt limited the rule by demand-
ing both a knowledge and a specific intent requirement.
In Keyikdan v. Board of Regents,24 the Supreme Court re-
considered its decision in Adler. Applying the Elfbrandt criteria
it held that the provision requiring state empolyees to swear
that they were not members of the Community Party was un-
constitutionally broad. In order to obtain a conviction, the Court
20. Id. at 382 (dissenting opinion).
21. Id. at 368 n.7.
22. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
23. Id. at 18.
24. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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asserted, the employees must have the specific intent to further
unlawful aims. The Court also held invalid the statutory pro-
vision requiring state employees to certify that they had not by
word of mouth or writing wilfully and deliberately advocated,
advised or taught the doctrine of forceful overthrow of the
government. The Court stated that "[t]his provision is plainly
susceptible of sweeping and improper application." 25 The Court
explained that advocating, advising and teaching could be
construed as including a wide range of innocent activity.26
Although the Court did not mention Garner, the similarity in
the oath provisions lead to the conclusion that Garner was over-
ruled sub silentio.
The Supreme Court has recently considered the validity of a
loyalty oath statute in Wkitekill v. Elkins.27 Maryland teachers
were required to certify that they were "not engaged in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the Government
of the United States, or the State of Maryland, or any political
subdivision of either of them, by force or violence." 28 The
opinion recognized the earlier Maryland case of Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors. By a process of reasoning that defies
analysis,29 the majority of the Court failed to overrule Gerende,
while it ruled the Wlztell oath to be unconstitutionally vague.
The majority opinion incorporated the entire authorizing statute
into the oath. A portion of that statute defined a subversive
person as one who was a member of an organization that would
alter the form of government by revolution, force, or violence.
Utilizing the rhetorical question,30 the Court indicated that
the oath, by incorporating the authorizing statute, might in-
25. Id. at 599.
26. The court stated that the provision:
May -well prohibit the employment of one who merely advocates the
doctrine in the abstract without any attempt to indoctrinate others, or
incite others to action in furtherance of unlawful aims .... And in
prohibiting 'advising' the 'doctrine' of unlawful overthrow does the
statute prohibit mere 'advising' of the existence of the doctrine, or
advising another to support the doctrine? Since 'advocacy' of the doctrine
of forceful overthrow is separately prohibited, need the person 'teaching'
or 'advising' this doctrine himself 'advocate' it? Does the teacher who
informs his class about the precepts of Marxism or the Declaration of
Independence violate this prohibition? Id. at 599, 600.
27. 88 S. Ct. 184 (1967).
28. Id. at 185.
29. Id. at 188.
30. "Would a member of a group that was out to overthrow the Government
by force or violence be engaged in that attempt 'in one way or another' within
the meaning of the oath, even though he was ignorant of the real aims of the
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elude undefined innocent activity (membership in a subversive
organization without the specific intent of furthering its un-
lawful purposes).
The dissenting opinion indicated that "[t]he oath [did] not
refer to the statute or otherwise incorporate it by reference. It
[contained] no terms that are further defined in the statute."3'
The dissent felt that the oath should have been judged without
inclusion of this statute. If it had been, the majority would have
had to overrule expressly its decision in Gerende or uphold the
oath as valid, because this oath was identical to the first half
of the Gerende oath as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of all loyalty oath
statutes brought before it when they were widely employed in
the years following World War II. In recent years, however,
the Court has held invalid all loyalty oath statutes which it has
considered. Without expressly admitting it, moreover, the
Supreme Court has overruled all of its earlier decisions with
the exception of Gerende; and its validity is doubtful. On the
basis of Gerende, it could be argued that a statutory oath, re-
quiring public employees to swear only that they are not "en-
gaged" in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the
government by force or violence, would be upheld by the Su-
preme Court. As the dissent pointed out in Thitehill, however,
the majority of the Court disapproves of loyalty oaths. The
word "engaged" could easily be given the same interpretation
given "advised," "advocated," and "taught" in Keyshian, and
consequently be held vague, unconstitutionally broad and in-
valid.
From an interpretation of Elfbrandt, it could be argued that
the Supreme Court would uphold the validity of an oath requir-
ing public employees to swear that they do not have the
specific intent of furthering the aims of any organization, to
which they might be a member, which has as its purpose the
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or
violence. The oath might also require them to swear that they
alone do not have the specific intent of overthrowing the govern-
ment of the United States by force or violence. Assuming the
Supreme Court might hold this oath valid, however, its effect
31. Id. at 188, 189 (dissenting opinion).
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would be nugatory. It would be very difficult to prove specific
intent. The purposes of the states in enacting loyalty oath
statutes would be indirectly thwarted.
Hosack V. Sniey,3 2 a federal district court decision, suggests
a possible constitutional construction of a loyalty oath. The
University of Colorado requires all its employees to swear that
they will support the Constitution and laws of the United States
and of the state of Colorado. This oath was upheld by the Dis-
trict Court of Colorado. It is difficult to conceive of any way in
which the Supreme Court could find this loyalty oath vague
and unconstitutionally broad.
In every loyalty oath decision since Cramp the Court has
mentioned its great concern for first amendment rights. It is
possible that the Supreme Court will not uphold the validity
of any loyalty oaths because the oaths may impede the "broad"
freedom of association. The Court does not seem willing to
overrule precedent or conclude that loyalty oaths are unjust per
se. In Baggett and WhitehilZ, however, the Court had to stretch
constitutional principles to find constitutional violations. This
possibly indicates, therefore, that the Court has indulged in
some personal subjective considerations; and has determined
that loyalty oaths are unjust per se.
EDwnq B. BRADING
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INSURANCE-INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR
UNREASONABLE REFUSAL TO SETTLE
WITHIN POLICY L1MITS*
I. INTRODUTON
Most insurance policy holders are unaware of their right to
recover damages from their insurance company arising out of
its wrongful refusal to settle an insurance claim. Under the
terms of the typical insurance policy, the insurer has the ex-
clusive right to negotiate the settlement of a case;1 and gen-
erally, it has the right to decide whether or not it will effect a
settlement. Nevertheless, the insurer cannot arbitrarily refuse
a settlement; rather, it must act in good faith in handling the
interests of its insured.2 Nor can the insurance company merely
tender the full amount of the policy coverage without consider-
ing the nature of the claim and the extent of the insured's in-
volvement. The defense of such suits by the insurer is a valuable
right for which the insured pays and to which he is entitled
under the policy.3
The recent case of 6 sci v. Security Insurance Company4
illustrates this much litigated issue. Security insured Mrs.
Crisci for $10,000 and was obligated under the general liability
policy to defend any claim against her and to make any settle-
ment it deemed expedient. Mrs. Crisci was sued by her tenant
who was injured when a stairway collapsed in her apartment
house. The tenant suffered physical injuries and developed a
severe psychosis. After confronting psychiatric evidence that
the accident caused the tenant's psychosis, Security refused an
offer for settlement within the policy limits. A jury awarded
the plaintiff-tenant $100,000. After an unsuccessful appeal the
insurance company paid $10,000 of this amount. The plaintiff
collected the balance of $90,000 from Mrs. Crisci. Mrs. Crisci
sued Security alleging a breach of implied covenant of good
• Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
1. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv.
L. REV. 1136, 1137 (1954); Annot, 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 170 n.1 (1955). See also
7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4711, at 551 (1962).
2. 45 C.J.S. Ismirance § 936 (1946).
3. American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951). See gener-
ally 14 CoucH ON INSURANE § 51:32 (2d ed. 1965).
4. 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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faith for its failure to settle within the policy limits and was
awarded $91,000, plus interest. In addition, Mrs. Crisci, who
had attempted suicide after becoming ill and impoverished,
recovered $25,000 for mentaZ =sffering.
II. DUTY OF INSUIEfR TO SETTLM
There is a definite disparity of interests created between the
insurer and the insured when an offer to settle is made by a
claimant. The insured is anxious for any settlement within the
limits of its insurance policy. The insurer with a fixed liability
will attempt to effect a low settlement below the policy limits.
There is a coinciding division of opinion within the nation's
judiciary regarding the emphasis the insurer must accord to
these conflicting interests. The older cases permit the insurance
company to consider its interests above those of the insured.5
Others have held that the insured's and the insurer's interests
should be given equal consideration.6 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court has held that, if there is a conflict of interest, the
insurer is bound by its contract of indemnity and good faith
to subordinate its interests to those of the insured.7
The great majority of jurisdictions define the insurer's li-
ability in terms of "negligence" and "bad faith."8 "Bad faith,"
generally, embraces more than bad judgment or negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing, and em-
braces an actual intent to mislead or deceive another.9 The
burden of proving "bad faith" rests with the insured.'0
Other jurisdictions, including South Carolina, have rejected
the "bad faith" rule, holding the insurer liable for negligence
in refusing a reasonable compromise offer." The degree of care
5. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932) ;
St Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employer's Indem. Corp., 224 Mo. App.
221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (1930).
6. See, e.g., Traders General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621
(10th Cir. 1942); Johnson v. Hardware Mut Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817
(1938).
7. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E.
346, 348 (1933) ; accord., American Cas. Co. v. Howard 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.
1951).
8. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178 (1955).
9. Harrod v. Merdian Mut. Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1965).
10. City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643
(1929).
11. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346
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required under the "negligence test" is usually that which an
ordinary prudent person would exercise in the conduct of his
own affairs.12  The question of the insurer's negligence is left
to the jury.13 If there is no real evidence of negligence, however,
the court may make such determination as a matter of law.
14
The negligence test looks to the manner and skill of the in-
surer in conducting all aspects of the investigation together with
all facts and circumstances leading to the decision to reject the
proposed settlement.' 5
Some commentators have observed that, for all practical
purposes, there is no difference between the "bad faith" and
"cnegligence" tests.1 There is, however, at least one noticeable
difference. While bad faith may be established with some cer-
tainty, formulating a standard of due care for negligence, to
be employed in evaluating the insurer's exercise of judgment,
involves considerable practical difficulty.17
In some jurisdictions the negligence and bad faith standards
seem to coalesce with the result that a showing of negligence
is considered an element in determining the bad faith issue. In
other jurisdictions both rules apply-the negligence rule to the
investigation and processing of the claim and the bad faith rule
to the litigation of the claim.
18
The South Carolina court seems to have merged the two tests.
The Tyger River cases 9 established that a liability insurer has
the duty to compromise a claim against its insured if the cir-
cumstances make it reasonable to do so. An insurer who acts
unreasonably and is guilty of negligence, fraud or bad faith in
its failure or refusal to settle a claim within its policy limits
12. Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 92 N.H. 140, 26 A2d 361
(1942). See generally 3 Wi&. & MARY L. REv. 357, 370 (1962).
13. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E.
346, 348 (1933).
14. Automobile Mut. Indenm Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1935).
See also 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURAMcE LAw & PRAcTicE 4713, at 578 (1962).
15. Cunningham, Liability in Excess of Policy Limits, 1957 INs. L.J. 483,
487 (1957). See 3 Wf. & MiARy L. REv. 357, 372 (1962) for examples of cir-
cumstances constituting negligence.
16. E.g., Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HAR,. L. Ran. 1136, 1140 (1954).
17. Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808, 809-10 (6th Cir. 1934)
(dictum).
18. E.g., American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951).
19. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
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is responsible for damages resulting from such negligence,
fraud or bad faith. The court has also determined that negli-
gence unaccompanied by fraud or bad faith in failing to settle
gives rise to a cause of action.
III. WHEw DoEs nmn CAuSE or AcTIoN ARsn?
Judicial opinions have generally divided with respect to
whether the insured must pay the judgment in excess of the
policy limits before he can recover from the insurer. The older
decisions require payment of the excess judgment as a condition
precedent to recovery. They reason that until actual payment is
made the injury is both contingent and speculative. 20 The more
recent cases have held that entry of the judgment completes
the actionable wrong and is sufficiently injurious to permit the
insured to recover.21 In Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company 22 the Pennsylvania court ruled that the insured's
payment to his judgment creditor was not a prerequisite to a
cause of action against the insurer. The court gave these reasons
for adopting the "non-payment" view:
(1) Such view prevents an insurer from benefiting from
the impecuniousness of an insured who has a meritorious
claim but cannot first pay the judgment imposed upon
him.
(2) Were payment the rule, an insurer with an insolvent
insured could unreasonably refuse to settle, for, at
worst, it would only be liable for the amount specified
by the policy.
(3) Such view recognizes that the fact of entry of the
judgment itself against the insured constitutes a real
damage to him because of the potential harm to his
credit rating.23
In Chitty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany14 the South Carolina District Court recognized the division
of opinion among many jurisdictions, and observed that the
20. E.g., Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Franldurt Maine, Accident & Plate Glass
Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917).
21. E.g., National Fanner Union Property & Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F2d
60 (9th Cir. 1964); Lee v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 286 F2d 295, 296 (4th
Cir. 1961).
22. 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966).
23. Id. at 506, 223 A.2d at 10. See also 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 726, 728 (1966).




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[.
South Carolina Supreme Court had not decided the question. It
determined that the more logical and better reasoned view was
not to require payment by the insured before suit could be
brought against the insurer. Recently, in Andrews v. Commercial
Union Insurance Company,25 the district court essentially re-
stated its Chitty opinion concluding that it was not necessary for
the insured to pay the excess judgment; and that it was no
defense to the insured's claim that he had insufficient assets
for its payment.2 6 If this apparent majority rule is followed,
and the insured is permitted to sue the insurer before paying the
claimant, it also follows that he must thereafter pay the claimant
from the proceeds of the suit.
IV. SHOULD TiE IN sURED BE ALLOWED TO ASSIGN
HIs CAUSE OF AcTIoN TO THE CLAIMANT?
In discussing the possibility of assignment of a claim by the
insured to the judgment creditor, consideration must be given
to whether the cause of action is ex delicto or ew contractu. Mod-
ern common law prohibits two types of assignment:
(1) Tort action for .personal injuries [ex delieto].
(2) A cause of action based on an executory contract which
is purely personal in nature or contains a provision
forbidding assignment [ex contraotu].27
The California Supreme Court recognized that a provision for-
bidding assignment does not preclude transfer of a cause of
action for breach of the policy. 28 This decision reaffirms a
generally well settled area of the law. If an executory contract
is unassignable because of a nonassignment provision or other-
wise, it is generally recognized that once the contract is breached,
giving rise to liability, the reason for the prohibition is removed
and the cause of action may be assigned.29 If the court, there-
fore, regards the action as one ex contractu, the wrongful refusal
to settle constitutes a breach making an action to recover as-
25. 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967).
26. See Walker v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 381, 154 S.E. 221
(1930) ; Pickett v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 60 S.C. 477, 38 S.E. 160 (1901).
27. 6 Am. Jun. 2d Assignments § 29 (1963). See also 6 Amd. Jun. 2d Assign-
eients § 11 (1963).
28. Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958). See also Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 833 (1958).
29. Rosecrans v. William S. Lezier Inc., 142 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1944);
Ginsburg v. Bull Dog Auto. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 328 Ill. 571, 160 N.E. 145 (1928) ;
Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1387 (1928). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-210 (1962).
[Vol. 20
36
outh Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss2/7
1968]03CMNTS
signable. Only a few states, however, recognize that the action
based upon an executory contract may be in contract. 30
A cause of action based on a tort causing "strictly" personal
injuries that does not survive, is not capable of being assigned.a
In the early case of Miller v. Newell3 2 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court stated:
Torts, in their effects, may be divided into two classes, to
wit: those which affect injuriously the estate, real or
personal, of a party, and those which cause injuries strictly
personal; those which survive.. . and those which die with
the party injured. It appears that those which affect the
estate may be assigned, but those of a personal character
cannot.38
In the recent case of Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company34 the supreme court focused upon the precise question
of whether a cause of action for tortious personal injuries is
assignable in South Carolina. The court recognized that Miller
held generally that torts of a personal character did not survive.
The supreme court, however, interpreted Miller to mean that
if a cause of action for a tort survived, it would be assignable.
The court next acknowledge the split of opinion among the
federal district court judges with respect to South Carolina law"8
and affirmed the principle laid down in BuZtman v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company.3 6 Bultman held that Section
3963 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1912 (Section 10-209
30. Arizona, In re Layton, 221 F. Supp. 667 (D.C. Ariz. 1963) ; California,
Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Pennsylvania, Gray v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223
A.2d 8 (1966); Wisconsin, Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235
N.W. 413 (1931).
31. 6 Ame. Jun. 2d Assigznents § 37 (1963).
32. 20 S.C. 124 (1882).
33. Id. at 139. For the view that the damage is one of property and not
personal, see Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d
69 (1958).
34. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E2d 370 (1963). The South Carolina Supreme
Court held Doremus as controlling in Hope v. Sullivan, 246 S.C. 218, 143
S.E.2d 367 (1965). See also 16 S.C.L. REv. 167, 210-11 (1964).
35. The question of assignability of a cause of action for personal injuries
has been passed upon on three occasions by the federal district court in South
Carolina, C.f. Hair v. Savannah Steel Drum Corp., 161 F. Supp. 654. (E.D.S.C.
1955) ; c.f. Lisenby v. Patz, 130 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ; McWhirter v.
Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (W.D.S.C. 1941).
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of the 1962 Code)37 providing for the survival of certain causes
of action, had the incidental effect of making such causes of
action assignableA The South Carolina court has acknowledged
two instances in which a cause of action survives: (1) injuries
and trespasses to and upon real estate, and (2) any and all
[physical] injuries to the person or to personal property.39 In
contrast, a cause of action for fraud and deceit is generally held
not to survive. 40 As a general rule, therefore, survival is the
test of assignability of a right of action in tort [ex deZeito].
V. ELEMENTS OF DAM1AGES INcLuDED IN INsuiE's REcovERy
Punitive damages have generally been denied in cases involv-
ing mere negligence. Here again the negligence and bad faith
test may become significant. In ZumwaZt v. Utilities Insurance
Company41 the Missouri court was confronted with a factual
situation similar to that presented in Crisci. The court held that
when the insurer was obligated to subordinate its interests in
favor of the insured's, the refusal to settle did not constitute such
malicious, willful, intentional or reckless conduct to warrant an
award of punitive damages. 42 Punitive damages were held
improper in the Texas case of Linkenhozer v. American Fidelity
and Casualty Company.43 The court ruled that negligence in
rejecting a compromise offer did not amount to gross negligence
necessary to warrant an award of punitive damages. In South
Carolina punitive damages are allowed in tort actions when there
37. Id. at 517, 88 S.E. at 280; S.C. CODE ANx. § 10-209 (1962).
Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and trespasses
to and upon real estate and any and all injuries to the person or to personal
property shall survive both to and against the personal or real representa-
tion as the case may be of a deceased person and the legal representative of
an insolvent person or a defunct or insolvent corporation, any law or rule
to contrary notwithstanding.
38. Bultman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 103 S.C. 512, 88 S.E. 279 (1915).
39. Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 256, 262, 15 S.E.2d
117, 119, (1941) ; cf. Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381, S.W.
2d 914 (1964).
40. E.g., Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d
370 (1963).
41. 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
42. Id. at 374, 228 S.W.2d at 756; see State v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 177, 153
S.W2d 46 (1941).
43. 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1953).
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is proof of willful, reckless or malicious violation of a person's
rights.
44
In order for a breach of contract to entitle the insured to
punitive damages in South Carolina the breach must be with
fraudulent intent and accompanied by a fraudulent act. The
mere failure or refusal to pay money, for whatever motive, is not
a basis for an award of punitive damages unless accompanied
by a fraudulent act.45 The conduct of the insurer in attempting
to settle a claim for a sum substantially less than the amount
owing under the policy, however, is evidence from which fraud
can be inferred. It is sufficient to require the trial judge to sub-
mit the issue of fraud to the jury.
46
South Carolina generally agrees with the majority of states
that in the absence of physical contact or fear of physical harm
there can be no recovery for mental suffering.4 7 There is grow-
ing authority, however, to the contrary.48 The Crisci court
recognized that many jurisdictions have allowed damages for
mental distress when the tortious conduct constituted an inter-
ference with property rights. It found no substantial reason to
compel it to distinguish these decisions from the instant case.49
In Dawkis v. NationaZ Liberty Life Insurance Company, ° an-
other case involving mental suffering, the plaintiff brought an
action ex contractu to recover for the alleged fraudulent breach
of an insurance contract. The court held that mental suffering
was not a proper element of damages for the fraudulent breach
of a contract unless the breach permitted the injured party to
sue in either contract or tort.51
There can generally be no recovery of the expenses of litigation
44. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton,
244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957). The court stated that negligent conduct may
be so gross as to merit characterization as willful and wanton in the sense of
the rule for punitive damages; accord, Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills
Co., 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740 (1954).
45. Dawkins v. National Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800 (D.S.C.
1966).
46. Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316 (1964).
47. Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d
265 (1958); Black v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 82 S.C. 478, 64 S.E. 418
(1907) ; cf. Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 160 S.E.2d 528 (S.C. 1968).
48. See Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Mich. App. 688, 143
N.W.2d 612 (1966); Continental Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So.
753 (1935); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1948); Battala v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
49. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
50. 252 F. Supp. 800 (D.S.C. 1966).
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or attorneys' fees from the opposing party unless provided for
by the contract or statute.52 In Mayland Casualty Company
v. Elmira Coal Company,53 however, the court allowed the in-
sured to recover the expense of attorneys' fees incurred when
the claimant sued the insured following the insurer's refusal to
settle."4 The South Carolina District Court recently recognized
the Elmira decision but disallowed the insured's claim for
attorney's fees, since he sought fees for the current action and
not those fees incurred in defense of the original action brought
by the claimant.55
VI. CONCLUSION
The balancing of interests between the insured and his in-
surance company with relation to the liability of the insurer for
wrongful refusal to settle an insurance claim has gradually
shifted to favor the insured. An increasing number of courts have
required the insurer to exercise a higher duty of care in its con-
sideration of settlements. These courts, moreover, have not
required the insured to pay a judgment in excess of the insurance
policy limits before he can bring an action against his insurer
for the excess. Many courts have also applied survival of a
cause of action as the test of assignability of a right of action
in tort.
The South Carolina judiciary has been in accord with the
general trends in each of these areas. In Crisci, however, a court
has introduced a new element to damage recovery-mental suf-
fering. Because the general tort law in South Carolina has never
considered mental suffering as the sole basis of recovery,5 6 South
Carolina will hesitate to follow California in this damage ex-
tension. Recognizing this qualification, the South Carolina
judiciary indicates that it will continue to weigh considerations
in these cases in favor of the insured.
JAmES R. HoNEYcuTT
52. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Cosby, 277 Ala. 596, 173 So.2d
585 (1965); United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97
S.E.2d 403 (1956); Brown v. Spann, 3 Hill 324 (S.C. 1837) ; see Annot., 90
A.L.R. 530 (1933) (annotation on the validity of statutes authorizing recovery
of attorneys' fees). See also American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound
Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958) (allowing recovery of attorneys' fees
under applicable statute).
53. 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934).
54. Id. at 620.
55. Andrews v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967).
566. See Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 160 S.E.2d 528 (S.C. 1968).
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TAXATION-THE "OVERNIGHT" RULE-
BUSINESS TRIPS MUST INVOLVE SLEEP
BEFORE TRAVELING EXPENSES
MAY BE DEDUCTED*
In order to appreciate fully United States v. CorreZl,' take
these words: "There shall be allowed as a deduction... in car-
rying on any trade or business ... traveling expenses (including
amounts expended for meals and lodging...) while away from
home .... " From these, extract "while away from home." Turn
the words over in your mind, play with them, draw upon all
reason for an application of these words as a limiting device for
allowing a business expense deduction. Now take these words:
"[An] ... employee can deduct expenses for meals and lodging
only when... his duties require him to obtain necessary sleep
away from home."8 To say that the latter statement is a reason-
able promulgation of a ruling to implement the former statutory
language, requires, at best, reading more into the statute than
Congress provided; or, at worst, an unashamed emasculation by
the Commissioner of a legitimate business deduction. When the
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Correll-the first
time the "overnight" rule had been considered by the Court-it
was felt that the Court might put the plain meaning back into
the statute. On December 11, 1967, however, Justice Stewart,
speaking for a majority of five, reversed the lower court's de-
termination and held that the "overnight" rule was a "reason-
able" interpretation of the applicable Code language.4
Before examining the case itself, it may be helpful to discuss
briefly the history of the "overnight" rule. The original version
of the present section 162(a) (2), which allows the deduction of
traveling expenses, was enacted in 1921.5 A prior regulation had
imposed the burdensome task of trying to determine the excess
expended for meals and lodging over the "expenditures ordi-
narily required for such purposes when at home."6 In supporting
*United States v. Correll, 88 S.Ct 445 (1967).
1. 88 S. Ct. 445 (1967).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 162(a) (2).
3. Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 CuM. BuL.. 75, 79.
4. United States v. Correll, 88 S. Ct 445, 450 (1967).
5. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 227
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the 1921 enactment the Treasury seemed to imply that allowing
the entire amount of the expenditure permitted a more accurate
determination of the deduction.
Nineteen years passed before the Commissioner first inter-
preted "away from home" to mean away from home overnight.7
The Commissioner allowed a deduction in a ruling involving
locomotive engineers and other railroad trainmen assigned to
long runs, who, on arrival at away-from-home terminals, were
released from their jobs for necessary rest.8 In 1954 the Com-
missioner interpreted this ruling in unambiguous language: 9
"The line of demarcation.., is generally referred to, for Fed-
eral income tax purposes, as an 'overnight' trip, that is a trip
in which the taxpayer's duties require him to obtain necessary
sleep away from his home .... 10
After the federal circuit court case of Wiliams v. Patterson,11
the Commissioner slightly expanded this rule. There the tax-
payer was a railroad conductor whose train left his home at
6:45 A.M. and arrived in Atlanta at 12:15 P.M. He did not
have to report back for the return ran until 6:15 P.M., and
arrived home near midnight. During the six hour break in the
afternoon he ate dinner at a hotel, rented a room and slept for
several hours. He then ate supper and reported back to work.
Revenue Ruling 54-49712 stated that the employee could obtain
"necessary sleep." The Commissioner contended that this meant
it had to be required by the employer. 8 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's contention
and held that due to the unusual hours of the taxpayer's em-
ployment it was reasonable for him to rest during his release
from duty, and as a result the deduction was allowed. The
commissioner acquiesced in Williams but asserted that he would
not consider an employee's release for the purpose of eating
rather than sleeping as constituting an adequate rest period to
satisfy the "overnight" rule.14
Throughout this period the Commissioner had the task of
7. I.T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. BuLL. 64.
8. Id.
9. Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 75.
10. Id. at 79.
11. 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
12. 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 75.
13. Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1961).
14. Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 34.
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implementing the Internal Revenue Code.' 5 At the same time
the judiciary had the task of applying the Commissioner's rulings
in its own interpretations of the pertinent Code sections.
In Correll the Court used a rule of statutory construction
stating that "[t]reasury regulations and interpretations long con-
tinued without substantial change, applying to... substantially
reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional
approval and have the effect of law."' 6 The Court cited He-
vering v. Winmil' 7 and Fribourg Navigation Company v. Com-
missioner's for the reenactment principle. These cases, however,
may both be distinguished from Correll. The Winmill case was
concerned with whether brokerage commissions were included
in the sale price of securities. Supporting that case were a set-
tled rule of the Treasury, uniform rulings of the Board of Tax
Appeals, and no adverse judicial decisions.' 9 Fribourg dealt
with established law concerning the question of the taking of
depreciation in the year of sale of a depreciable asset. The tax-
payer cited numerous cases and several rulings supporting his
position. The Court noted that "in several instances, the Com-
missioner did not merely consent to depreciation in the year of
sale, but insisted over the taxpayer's objection that it be taken."20
In comparison to these situations, the "overnight" rule was
not only unsettled, but the approval by some courts and repudia-
tion by others had created an almost chaotic situation. The Com-
missioner had adhered to this rule since he first enunciated it.21
The courts, however, had been sharply divided. The Sixth22
and the Eighth23 Circuits had disavowed the rule totally, and
15. INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 7805(a).
16. United States v. Correll, 88 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1967).
17. 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
18. 383 U.S. 272, 283 (1966).
19. See Hutton v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1930).
20. Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 279 (1966).
21. In recommending additional statutory guides to clarify the law, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury kept the time requirement. "Food and lodging ex-
penses would be deductible by taxpayers who were temporarily away from
their duty areas for periods of at least 16 hours, or a shorter time if they
could prove that substantial rest was required on such trip." Hearings Before
the Committee on Ways and Means on The Tax Recommentdations of the
President, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 98 (1961).
22. Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
23. United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); Hanson v.
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the Fifth Circuit 24 had modified it. The First Circuit had been
opposed to the rule2 5 and only recently accepted it.
2 6
The Tax Court's treatment of the rule bordered upon judicial
schizophrenia as it ran the gamut from disapproval, to making
a decision of each case on its particular facts, to a position of
general acceptance. In a 1949 case involving transportation costs
only,2 7 the Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's reading of
the statute and evaluated the phrase "away from home" stating:
"There is no connotation that the trip must be an overnight one,
nor do we think Congress intends such a connotation."28 The
following year the court refused to allow the deduction of meal
expenses for a railway clerk who at supper at the "away town"
on a round trip that lasted six hours and fifteen minutes.2 9 The
deduction was denied because the taxpayer's work day was
"shorter than the work day for the ordinary worker."30
The Tax Court in 1952 decided the case of David G. Ander-
son.8 ' The court allowed the deduction of the meal expense of
Anderson, a railroad employee, who started on a round trip
at 2:00 A.M. and returned the same day. As the trip required
sixteen hours to complete, the court concluded that the need
to obtain rest on completion of the outbound run prior to com-
mencing the return run was sufficient to come within the rule.
This was the same interpretation of the rule that the Fifth
Circuit subsequently employed in Williams V. Patteson.3 2 The
Commissioner, however, never recognized the result in the An-
derson case; yet he issued a ruling nine years later in which he
acquiesced in the Williams case.
3 3
In the 1954 case of Frank N. SmitA 34 the Tax Court again
repudiated the "overnight" rule in dictum. This was followed
24. Williams v. Patterson, 286 F2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961) (allowing deduc-
tion for expenses on trips of such a duration that the employee required rest).
25. Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955).
26. Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
27. Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949).
28. Id. at 417.
29. Fred Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950).
30. Id. at 1262.
31. 18 T.C. 649 (1952).
32. 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
33. Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum!. BULL. 34.
34. 21 T.C. 991 (1954).
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by a general acceptance of the rule.35 The reasoning used in
Allan J. HansoYA6 is an example of the court's attitude with
respect to general acceptance.
This interpretation seems justified for the statute is only
dealing with expenses "while away from home." A lodger
is one who, for the time being, is lodged away from home.
One who completes a business trip in one day is not "away
from home" within the meaning of the statute. He incurs
meal expenses on such a day the same as he does on a day
he takes no trip. But on both days the meal expenses were
personal expenses for they were incurred while he was
lodged in his own home.
32
In the recent case of Wiliam, A. Bagley,38 however, the court
modified its position with regard to the "overnight" rule. The
court asserted that Congress had not voiced approval of an in-
flexible rule disallowing the deduction of meal expenses on
trips which were not overnight. The court stated that the facts
of each case should be considered subjectively.
It is submitted that during the period in which the "overnight"
rule was developed both the Tax Court and the Commissioner
misinterpreted the Code phrase "while away from home." The
logical application of the phrase "away from home" is in a
geographical test, not a time consideration. For tax purposes,
the word "home" in the phrase was originally given the meaning
of "post of duty or place of employment on duties connected
with his employment."3 9 This definition, subsequently accepted
by the Commissioner,40 had a plain meaning of geographical
location. In deciding Amoroso v. Commissioner,41 the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit was faced with a case involving
a salesman who lived in Milton, Massachusetts, a suburb ten
miles from Boston. In disallowing the deduction of the tax-
35. E.g., Fred G. Armstrong, 43 T.C. 733 (1965) ; Allan J. Hanson, 35 T.C.
413 (1960), revd, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962); Al J. Smith, 33 T.C. 861
(1960); Donald G. Harper, 23 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 461 (1964); William S.
Blomeley, Jr., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 514 (1964); Warren Cummings, 20
CCH Tax Ct Mem. 1699 (1961); Ernest Huddleston, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mere.
395 (-954).
36. 35 T.C. 413 (1960), rev'd, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
37. Id. at 417.
38. 46 T.C. 176 (1966), rev'd, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
39. Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927).
40. G.C.M. 23672, 1943 Cum BULL. 66.
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payer's meals in Boston while on daily business trips, the court
interpreted "away from home" and made no mention of a time
consideration. The court looked at the distance of travel and
the fact that Milton was considered to be part of the greater
Boston metropolitan area in concluding that the taxpayer never
left his "home." The court could have dismissed the case easily
if it had used the overnight test. It apparently, however, de-
termined that time was not a valid test, and, instead, employed
the geographical test.
The meaning can be focused more clearly by substituting the
Commissioner's definition of "home" into section 162(a) (2):
"There shall be allowed as a deduction . . .in carrying on any
trade or business ... traveling expenses (including amounts ex-
pended for meals and lodging . . .) while away from [the
business location, post, or station of the taxpayer] .... ,42
It is also inaccurate to assert that Congress limited the travel
expense deduction that it granted by reenactment of the statute;
because Congress cannot add to or diminish a tax statute by
impliedly approving a Treasury interpretation.43 Even if this
were accurate, when an erroneous construction has been placed
on a statute by the body (Treasury Department) charged with
its enforcement, the rule that the reenactment of the statute
adopts the body's construction does not apply.
44
In deciding the result in Correll the Court, interpreting sec-
tion 162 (a) (2), stated that the Code language, "meals and
lodging,"4" could arguably mean that to be allowed a deduction
for meals the taxpayer must also incur lodging expenses.46 A
gramnnatical construction of section 62(2) (B) which states that
a deduction for travel expenses while away from home for
employees "consist[s] of expenses of travel, meals, and lodging
," would lead to the opposite result. Unlike section
162(a) (2), three principal deductions are listed and commas
have distinctively separated the terms; and the word "consists"
indicates that any of the three expenses may be used separately.
It is contended, therefore, that the phrase "away from home,"
not the presence of the word "and" in the phrase "meals and
42. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a)(2).
43. Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 83, 93 (1959); Arkansas-Oklahoma
Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1953).
44. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1929).
45. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) (2).
46. United States v. Correll, 88 S. Ct 445, 448 (1967).
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COMMENTS
lodging," should have been the determining language for the
deduction. In the treasury regulations for section 214(a) (1)
of the Revenue Act of 1921, moreover, the Commissioner used
this language to define traveling expenses: "Traveling expenses,
as ordinarily understood, include railroad fares and meals and
lodging."47 Was the Commissioner saying that a taxpayer on
making a business trip away from home had to ride a train
before he could deduct expenses for meals and lodging? Again,
applying the reasoning employed in Correll, the answer to the
question would be, incorrectly, yes.
In most of the cases in which a court has decided not to fol-
low the "overnight" rule, examples have been given to dem-
onstrate the potential inequitable effects of the rule. With the
broad holding in Correll, however, it will be difficult to deter-
mine the scope of its future interpretation. A businessman could
fly to Washington from St. Louis at 6:00 A.M., work the entire
day, and purchase his dinner and supper. If he left that night
after eating he would get no deduction for his meals. Another
person could drive over from Baltimore, Maryland on business,
purchase dinner and supper, check into a motel for an hour's
rest, drive back to Baltimore and be allowed to deduct the en-
tire expense. This does not seem to be a proper application of
the statute.
The Supreme Court and the Commissioner should not be al-
lowed to rewrite legislation. If Congress felt that the overnight
feature should be included in the traveling expense deduction,
it could be included by amending the statute. Although the rule
is one of administrative convenience, and provides a simple and
certain interpretation, a comment made by the Tax Court in
William A. Bagley48 best summarizes the problem. "[J]ust as
most rules of law yield to exceptions, so too must administrative
workability yield to logic, reason, and justice."49
Wnaza C. Sronx
47. Regulations 45, Art. 292 (1920 ed.). This language also appeared in
subsequent regulations. E.g., Regulations 77, Art. 122 (1933).
48. 46 T.C. 176 (1966), rev'd, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
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